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NOTES
PRIVATE CARRIERS AND TIiE HARTER AcT-The applicability of
the various sections of the Hartcr Act 1 to the transportation contracts
of private carriers by sea is still more or less unsettled. The cases
are neither numerous nor very decisive, perhaps largely because both
private and common carriers make a practice of incorporating that
Act in their contracts, and generally, though not always, an act other-
wise inapplicable but by agreement made an integral part of a contract
will have the same operative effect as when in force as law. This
practice on the part of private carriers is not wholly surprising. It
indicates perhaps a belief or fear that the Act applies to common and
private carriers alike. The Act itself says nothing on the subject.
For fourteen years after its passage the applicability of the Act
to private carriers does not seem to have been discussed in a reported
case. In 1907 2 the problem arose concerning a vessel which was
chartered to carry cattle from Carthagena to Cuba. Her contract of
affreightment exempted the owner from liability for negligence of
master or crew. It was held that this provision was a defense to an
action for cargo damage resulting from negligent stranding. The
court decided that the Act did not apply because the voyage was
between two foreign ports and the contract was made abroad, and
seems also to have decided that because the carrier was a private one,
the Act was not applicable, and that therefore a failure to prove due
diligence to make the vessel seaworthy was irrelevant. The decision
on the second point, however, -merely may have been that because the.
carrier in question was a private carrier, and because the contract did
not involve a voyage to which the act applied, the negligence clause
was not against public policy. At best, therefore, there is here only
a semble that the conditional clause of section 3 does not apply to the
disadvantage of private carriers. In I9o8,4 came a case involving a
negligent collision resulting in damage to cargo on board a private
carrier. On the authority of the preceding case, a clause exempting
liability for negligence was given effect. Because there was no proof
that the conditional clause of the Act was complied with, this is per-
haps again a scmble of the same sort. In the same year,
5 it was held
that a carrier, who must have been a private carrier, was entitled to
the benefit of section 3, without having stipulated for it. On the other
1 Act Feb. 13, 1893, c. 1o5, 27 Stat. 44s, U. S. Comp. Stat. (1918) § 8029.
'The Fri, 154 Fed. 333 (C. C. A. 2d., i9o7, certiorari denied, 210 U. S.
431).
'So interpreted in The G. R. Crowe, 294 Fed. 5o7 (C. C. A.. 2d, 1923).
'The Maine, 16x Fed. 401 (D. C. S. D. N. Y., i9o8). The head note goes
further than the decision warrants.
" Sun Co. v. Healey, 163 Fed. 48 (C. C. A. 2d, i9o8). There are other sitni-
lar cases.
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hand, in 1913 6 section i of the Act was held to invalidate a stipula-
tion in a bill of lading exempting a "special" as distinguished from a
common carrier as to liability for negligent care, custody, -and de-
livery of cargo. But in I923. T a leakage exemption in the charter
party of a private carrier of oil in bulk was given effect although the
leakage loss was found to be due to "unseaworthiness," i. e., defective
oil tanks. There is a very strong dictum that neither section x nor
section 2 applies to private carriers. Perhaps this unseaworthiness
was the result of a failure- to use due diligence. If so, the case is a
decision as to the inapplicability of section 2, but there is no statement
that the defect in the oil tanks was blameworthy, and if it was not
blameworthy, the court, construing the charter party as it did, must
have reached the same result in case the Harter Act did apply.' All
these cases occurred in the Southern District of New York or the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
In the District Court of Maryland, the problem has again come
before the court. 9 A private carrier in his contract of affreightment
stipulated against liability for collisions caused by negligence of
master or crew not resulting from a want of due diligence by the
o-wzner; and incorporated the Harter Act by reference. A negligent
collision caused cargo damage. There was a contention that the
vessel's steering gear was defective, i. e., that she was unseaworthy,
Bolton S. S. Co. v. Crossman, 2o6 Fed. 183 (D. C. S. D. N. Y, 1913). The
bill of lading had perhaps been negotiated. A different rule might well apply
as between a private carrier and a consignee who takes a bill of lading from the
shipper than as between such carrier and the original shipper.
" The G. R. Crowe, supra, note 3.
'In addition to the foregoing, there are cases involving private carriers
where a claim that section 2 applied might well have been made, but was not: e.
q., The Wildenfels, 161 Fed. 864 (C. C. A. 2d, zio8). There is an intimation
that all liability for negligence of employees may be bargained away: see The
Royal Sceptre, 187 Fed. 224 (D. C. S. D. N. Y., 1911). CARVER, CARRIAGE BY
SEA, § i036, (7th ed., 1925) says the Hater Act does not apply to private
carners.
As to who are private carriers by sea under our law, see, e. g., The Propel-
lor Niagara v. Cordes, 21 How. 7 (U. S., 1859); The Fri, supra, note 2; The
Maine, supra, note 4; The Wildenfels, supra; Swayne and Hoyt, Inc. v. Everett,
255 Fed. 7 (C. C. A. 9th, 1919).
g It seems to be settled that a shipper upon a private carrier has the burden of
proving negligence. See, since the Harter Act: The Wildenfels, supra; The
Rokeby, 202 Fed. 322 (D. C. S. D. N. Y., 19) ; The C. R. Sheffer, 249 Fed.
6oo (C. C. A. 2d, 1918) ; The Lyra, 255 Fed. 667 (C. C. A..9th, 1919); and Is
re S.S. Norden, infra, note 9; and that a stipulation by a private carrier against
liability for negligence is not invalidated by the rule of Railroad Co. v. Lock-
wood, 17 Wall. 357 (U. S., 1873), and Liverpool & G. W. Steam N. Co. V.
Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U. S. 397 (1889), see: The Fri, supra, note 2 (negligent
stranding); The Royal Sceptre, supra (dictum as to same and negligence of
master or pilot) ; The Maine, supra, note 4 (negligent collision).
The applicability of the Harter Act to charter parties by demise or of use
is outside the scope of this note.
'In re S.S. Norden (The Nordhvalen), 6 F. (2d) 883 (x925).
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and that this was partly or solely causative of the collision. The court
found that the carrier had sustained the burden of showing that'it
exercised due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy, and that negli-
gence of the owner in causing the collision was not proved. The court
expressly left open the question whether proof of compliance with
ihe provision of the contract vithout proof of compliance with the
conditional clause of section 3, or vice versa, would relieve the owner
of liability; in other Words, whether that section was in force merely
as an additional term in the contract or was in force as law, to be
complied with before any exemption was allowed. This decision
illustrates how a different result may be reached in a case where the
Act applies as a mere term of a contract from that reached when it
applies as law, for compliance solely with the chart& provision would
excuse in the former case but not in the latter.10 The case also casts
a doubt on the sembics in the first two cases previously cited.
-The law therefore must be regarded as unsettled. As to'section
x, there is a decision that it does apply to a bill of lading issued by a
private carrier, and a dictum that it does not apply to a charter party.
As to section 2, there is a dictum, if not an actual decision, that it
does not so apply. As to section 3, it seems that private carriers
may take advantage of its exemptions when they can satisfy the con-
ditional clause; and -there are'sembics and what we might term a
tendency to the effect that by apt stipulations they may escape the
disadvantages of that clause, that is, escape liability for damage result-
ing from negligent navigation without proving due diligence to make
their vessels seaworthy. But even with-the law unsettled as it is,
would not private carriers be in a stronger position if they ceased to
incorporate the Harter Act in their charter parties and contracts of
affreightment? " As to section 3, there can be very little doubt. If
it be eventually held that section 3 does not apply, they can secure the
benefit of its exemption clauses, or of better exemptions, by apt stipu-
lation, and they will not be put to the burden of showing due diligence
to make their vessels seaworthy as a condition to enjoying such
exemptions. On the other hand, if they incorporate section 3 in their
contracts, they will seemingly have that burden, for the section will
most likely be construed in the same way as a term of the contract
that it is now construed as law.'2 If it be held, however, that section
3 does apply to private carriers, they will be no worse off, for in such
event the inclusion of its exemptions, and of other better ones, would
not seem to be a violation of the penal clause, section S. As to sec-
tions i and 2, there is a greater risk. The risk will vanish, of course,
if the licta stated above are generally followed. Even if we assume
Unless it be assumed thit b6th charter provision and section 3 create a
liability as well as establishing an immunity.
" As in The G. R. Crowe, supra, note 3-e
"Cf. the principal case, supra. note 9; The Fort 'Morgan, 214 Fed. 734 (D.
C. Md., igom), see 23 MicH. L RE%. 157 (1924).
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that these sections do apply to private carriers, stipulations against
liability for negligent care, custody, stowage and delivery of cargo and
for all unseaworthiness, when inserted in a charter party or contract
of affreightment, are arguably not in violation of the penal clause for
it only punishes the insertion of such stipulations in bills of lading and
shipping documents, which seemingly charter parties and contracts of
affreightment are not."3 And in any event, when the law is so unset-
tled, an offending private carrier is not likely to be fined the maximum
of S2.ooo, and the experiment might be worth even that much to some.
Austin Tappan Wright.
RIGHT OF NoN-CuMULATIVE PREFERRED STOCKHOLDERS 
TO
BACK DIVIDENDS EARNED BUT UNPAID-One of the most interesting
recent developments of corporation law has been the attempt of
holders of non-cumulative preferred stock to assert dividend rights
which the financial world as a whole has been unwilling to concede.
During the lean years attendant on or immediately following the
war many companies, having outstanding issues of stock of this
order, failed to pay dividends in order to insure their financial
standing by accumulating earnings as surplus. Subsequent years,
having brought with them larger profits and an inclination on the
part of directors to pay dividends, the usual custom was to pay a
one-year dividend on preferred stock and to give to the common
stockholders the benefit of the remaining surplus. Non-cumulative
preferred stockholders, believing that they were entitled to a larger
share of the profits than was thus conferred upon them, sought ' he
intervention of equity to protect their rights. The basis of their con-
tention is that back dividends on non-cumulative stock earned but not
paid must be satisfied before common stockholders can participate in
the surplus.
Three recent cases illustrate the varying results of such demands
in different jurisdictions. In Day v. U. S. C. I. Pipe Co., and Moran
v. U. S. C. I. Pipe Co.,' the New Jersey courts decided in favor of
the rights of non-cumulative preferred stockholders. In Collins v.
Portland Elec. P. Co. and Kurta v. Portland Elec. P. Co.
2 the Federal
Court for the District of Oregon came to the same conclusion. In
Norwich W. Power Co. v. Southern Ry.,
3 however, Virginia reached
the opposite result.
"The G. R. Crowe, sufpra, note 3. But see Golcar S.S. Co. v. Tweedie
Trading Co., 146 Fed. 563, 570 (D. C. S. D. N. Y., s9o6).
'Reported together in 95 N. J. Eq. 389, 123 AtI. 546 (1924), aff'd in 
96
N. J. Eq. 698, 736, 126 AtI. 302, 326 (1925).
'Reported together in 7 F. (2d) 221 (D. C., x92S).
"Law and Equity Court of City of Richmond, Va., June 22, 925. Hearing
in Supreme Court of Virginia denied November, 1925.
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The situation presented by these various opinions is in general
somewhat as follows: A corporation with non-cumulative preferred
stock and common stock outstanding fails to pay dividends for several
years, preferring to use the earnings of the company for proper cor-
porate purposes. An unusually successful year following, the board
of directors determines to pay dividends in the same year on both
common and preferred stock. Preferred stockholders protest that
they have dividend claims for the years when profits were earned and
not paid and will seek to enjoin the common stock dividend. In order
to determine their legal rights, the board of directors declare a pre-
ferred dividend for one of the years when profits were earned but
not paid. The common stockholders, claiming that these dividends
were lost forever, because not paid within the year, then seek to enjoin
this later division. The rights of all classes of stockholders are thus
brought before the court.
The dividend rights of the respective classes of stockholders are
of course governed by the particular contracts, usually embodied in
the stock certificate and articles of association, to which they become
parties on purchasing their shares. The wording of these contracts
is by no means uniform, but they practically all contain, in addition to
the term "non-cumulative", a provision to the effect that as regards
the common stock the non-cumulative stock is a preferred security
entitled to its dividends in priority to the common stock. It is on the
interpretation of these two clauses that the non-cumulative stockholders
base their claims. In a particular case of course there may be other
language in the contract which will override by express words the
inference as to dividends which non-cumulative stockholders assert
arise from the two causes mentioned above. For'example, the stock
contract might provide that in any one year the board of directors may
pay dividends on the common stock if they have in the same year paid
the full dividend on the non-cumulative preferred stock. The non-
cumulative stockholders confine their claim to earned but unpaid
dividends to those stock contracts which:
i. Contain language defining their stock as "non-cumulative" and
as a stock whose dividend claims must be satisfied before any dividends
are set aside for the benefit of the common stock;
2. Do not contain language expressly authorizing the board to
pay common dividends without first satisfying back non-cumulative
preferred dividend claims.
They believe that "non-cumulative" refers solely to the amount
of the dividend, not to the time of payment, and that the 'priority of
payment clause restricts the payment of common dividends until all
claims which arise by reason of their interpretation of "non-
cumulative" are satisfied.
Before discussing in detail the three cases cited above, it is
desirable to determine what is the true meaning of the term "non-
cumulative", first on principle and second on authority.
NOTES
Historically the term "non-cumulative" has had no fixed definite
meaning at law. The term originated in an attempt to differentiate
such stock from cumulative preferred stock. The meaning of the
latter term is clearly understood to be that if for any reason dividends
are not paid on the stock in any one year, they must be made good out
of the profits of subsequent years before any dividends can be paid on
junior classes of stock. In other words, back dividends accumulate
until paid out of subsequent earnings.
4 Non-cumulative stock was
intended to have slighter preferences. How much slighter these pref-
erences were intended to be was not definitely understood. It is obvious
from the above that the term could have either of two meanings:
(i) Dividends whether earned or unearned, if not paid in the
particular year, do not accumulate and are lost forever;
(2) Dividends not earned in a particular year cannot be made
good out of the profits of subsequent years; but when earned in the
particular year must be paid before any dividends are paid on junior
classes of stock.
The latter part of this second definition arises from an interpre-
tation of the priority clause rather than from the inherent meaning of
"non-cumulative".
In the business and financial world the first definition was usually
assumed without any very careful analysis of the results which'would
follow. Consideration of the matter will show that these results are
rather unusual. According to the premise of the first defirition,
dividends if not declared within the year are lost forever, for they
cannot accumulate, and since in all preferred stocks the preference is
limited to a certain percentage per annum, non-cunfulative preferred
stockholders cannot be compensated for failure to pay dividends in
one year by dividends of more than the authorized percentage in the
following year. It is thus within the discretion of the board of
directors whether non-cumulative stockholders shall receive dividends
even if they are earned. If the board sees fit they can refuse for a
series of years to pay non-cumulative dividends, pile up a large surplus
of earnings, and, after paying one year's dividend on the non-
cumulative stock, cut the remainder of the melon for the exclusive
benefit of the common stockholders. This would seenj to be an
unwise power to vest in the board, for it makes the dividend rates of
the security depend on the whim of individuals, usually themselves
common stockholders, rather than on the stock contract, whose terms
are supposed to inform the stockholder of his rights. It may be
objected that a court of equity has the power to control an arbitrary
refusal by the board of directors to pay dividends. The answer to
'Norwich Water Power Co. y. Southern Railway Co., supra, note 3; Day v.
Cast Iron Pipe & Foundry Co., supra, note 1. See 1 MACHEN, CORPORAToIs,
§ 551 (Ed. 19o8); PALMER, COMPANY PRUECEDENTS, Pt. 1, 812 (ixth ed.); 6
FrL-xcEl, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS, § 3754 (Ed. 1919); i CooK, Coi-
PoRATIoNs, § 273 (8th ed. 1923).
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that objection is that if the above premise be assumed, there is nothing
arbitrary in the directors' action in building up a surplus in favor of
the common stockholders, for the theory assumes that preferred stock-
holders have no right to dividends not declared in the year they are
earned. This is illustrated by the case of Nortwich W. Powcr Co. v.
Southern Railw'ay, where the court, in adopting definition i above,
refused to allow non-cumulatiye stockholders back dividends, earned
but unpaid, amounting to over $38 a share, and made available as
dividends for the sole use of the common stockholders a surplus of
$8o,ooo,ooo, in so far as any right on the part of the non-cumulative
stockholders to demand a share thereof was concerned. If this action
is not considered arbitrary, it is submitted that the protection offered
non-cumulative stockholders by the intervention of equity is rather
illusory.
But not only does definition x above make it possible for a board to
prefer the common stockholders to the non-ctmulative preferred stock-
holders, but it also places a board well disposed towards the rights of
non-cumulative stockholders in an embarrassing position. Suppose in
any one year the company finds it necessary to spend a considerable
part of its net earnings in extensions and improvements rather than in
paying out the earnings to stockholders, are the directors to be faced
with the proposition that if they do not pay the earned dividend to the
non-cumulative stockholders, they will forever deprive this class of
their dividend rights for that year? Or suppose that, at the end of
the year, the board is doubtful as to the wisdom of an immediate
declaration of dividends because of the possibility that the next six
months may develop a necessity for ready cash, is it under the com-
pulsion of declaring a non-cumulative dividend immediately, or of
telling their non-cumulative stockholders that their rights are lost
forever, because such dividends cannot be permitted to accumulate?
It may be said that these .arguments merely prove that in certain
respects non-cumulative preferred stock is an undesirable investment.
5
This objection proves too much, for it makes out of non-cumulative
preferred stock such an undesirable investment that it is doubtful if
any investor, who fully realized the possibilities of the situation, could
be prevailed upon to accept it.6 In any event, it has neither the advan-
tage of the certainty of eventual dividends of cumulative preferred
'CONrXGTOs, CORPORATE ORGANIZATION, 82 (3d ed., 1912).
"How much capital would have been invested in the preferred stock
of this corporation if its charter had expressly provided that the Board of
Directors might, whenever and for as long as they might see fit, apply all
the net earnings to a permanent increase of the capital, which increase, of
course, would belong to the common stockholders on dissolution and would
increase only their dividends in the meanwhile instead of paying dividends
to the preferred stockholders? Naturally none at all .. .
Vhite, I., in Day v. United States Cast Iron Pipe and Foundry Com-
pany, supra, note 1.
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stock, nor the more speculative attraction of an equity in the company
and possibly unlimited dividends of common stock. This much is
granted by all. If there be added to these facts the further possibilities
mentioned above, all that remains of the preference of this supposedly
preferred issue is the right in any one year to dividends up to a certain
per cent. before unlimited dividends can be declared on the common
stock.
The effects of definition 2 above, namely, that non-cumulative
preferred stock is entitled to dividends earned but not paid in a par-
ticular year, but not dividends which are not earned within the year,
are quite different. Under this theory, the time of payment is
immaterial. If the board of directors, in the exercise of their dis-
cretion, see the necessity for building up a surplus, or for expending
earnings on extensions and improvements, they are free to do so.
The right of the non-cumulative stockholders is confined to the
crediting in their favor of back earnings so used. What may be called
a "dividend credit- is set tip in favor of non-cumulative stockholders,
to the extent that their dividend is earned in a particular year. This
"dividend credit" takes priority over the dividend rights of the
comn ion stockholders. To illustrate: if in a particular year the 6
per cent. non-cumulative preferred stock earned nothing, no credit is
erected; if the earnings are 4 per cent., which the board does not wish
to pay immediately, a credit to that extent in favor of the non-
cumulative stock is carried on the books of the company; if more than
6 per cent. is earned, the whole 6 per cent. dividend must be credited,
and the surplus is available for the common stock.
In discussing this whole subject, it is imrportaht to remember that
there is no "right", as such to dividends of any kind. The obligation
to distribute profits to stockholders in the shape of dividends is funda-
mentally different from the obligation of an interest-bearing debt.
The former obligation is entirely dependent on the discretion of the
board of directors as to the time of payment, and, if profits are never
realized, the stockholders never get a right to dividends. The "right"
asserted by those who interpret the meaning of "non-cumulative" and
the priority clause in accord with definition 2, is merely that when the
board, in the exercise of its discretion, determines that the time for
distribution has come, the distribution shall be made in such a way as
to give them, as opposed to the common stockholders, dividends for
the years when such dividends were earned but not paid. This
right is of course defeated if in the particular contract there is
language specifically permitting a common stock dividend before these
back non-cumulative claims are satisfied. Such language would not
defeat the interpretation of "non-cumulative", but would merely make
it possible for the board of directors to indefinitely postpone the pay-
ment of back non-cumulative dividends by paying out all available
cash to the common stockholders. It would not change the meaning
of "non-cumulative", but it would override the priority clause.
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This brings us to an intermediate theory which some of the cases
suggest. This is to the effect that while non-cumulative stockholders
are not entitled to earned but unpaid dividends after the expiration of
the year, yet, if the board sees fit to declare thein subsequently, it has
the power to do so. This view avoids the difficulty suggested above
where the board is in doubt as to the possibility of dividends, for it
repudiates the theory that non-cumulative dividends not paid within
the year are lost forever. It does not, however, surmount the funda-
mental objection that the board of directors, not the stock contract,
controls the dividend rights of stockholders, and that it still remains
within the power of the board to pile up a huge surplus and make it
available solely for the benefit of the common stock. To a marked
extent at least, it contradicts the designation "preferred" as stated in
the priority clause, and reduces non-cumulative stock to the category
of a most undesirable investment.
It is submitted that on principle definition 2 is preferable to either
definition i or the intermediate theory just suggested.
The authorities, however, are by no means harmonious on this
question of the right to earned but unpaid dividends. It is interesting
to note the situation, with regard to the opinion of text writers on
corporation law. Although always devoting considerable space to a
differentiation between "cumulative" and "non-cumulative" stock, they
have with two exceptions
7 failed to pass in express terms on the
particular question involved. An analysis of these works shows con-
tradictory language in different parts of the same text, which leave the
problem unsolved. 8
'CONYNGTON, CORPOLATE ORGANIZATION, supra, note 3, adopts definition
i; Cook in his latest work, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATION LAW, 1925, page 49,
adopts definition 2. See also A. A. Berle, Non-Cumulative Preferred Stock,
23 CoL L. REv. 358 (1923), urging definition 2. There are also notes in ii
VA. L. REv. 553 (1925), and 34 YALE L. J. 657 (1925), to the same effect.
'For citations see, supra, note 4. Machen refers in section 561, when dis-
cussing the power of a court to force payment of dividends, to a non-cumulative
dividend as being gone forever if once passed, but in section 551 he says that a
cumulative stock entitles the holders to claim that if the profits of the year are
insufficient to pay a dividend in that year the deficiency must be made good out
of the profits of some succeeding year before anything can be paid on the com-
mon stock. If, however, the provision is that the preferred stockholders are
entitled to a division of a specified amount "out of the profits of each year," it
evidences an intention to let each year stand on its own bottom and is a non-
cumulative dividend. The use of the word "deficiency," together with the
definition of "non-cumlative" as dependent upon the earnings of the particular
year, would seem to indicate that where there were earnings they must be paid
to non-cumulative stockholders.
Cook in his earlier work on corporations, 8th ed., Vol. 1, § 273, has contra-
dictory language. As pointed out in note 8, supra, however, his latest view on
the subject supports definition 2.
Fletcher has the following passage:
"Dividends on preferred stock may be either cumulative or non-cumu-
lative. Sometimes the dividends are in express terms made to depend on
the profits of the particular year, so that the holders of the stock will not
NOTES
Coming to the cases, we find prior to 192 . few definite holdings.
In England, no cases involving the interpretation of the word "non-
cumulative" have been found. It has been held, however, that where
stock contracts entitle holders of preferred shares to dividends out of
the net profits of each year, such dividends are not cumulative and are
entitled to dividends when earned in a particular year, so that although
the directors may use the earnings to improve the property, the money
so used must be paid to the preferred stockholders before any dividend
can be paid on the common stock.1'  Palmer,10 one of the leading
English authorities, declares that a stock contract conferring the right
to receive dividends out of the profits of the particular year to holders
of preferred stock, creates a non-cumulative dividend. From these
authorities it would seem to follow that the English rule supports
definition 2 above.
In the United States there are practically no decisions of impor-
tance prior to 1925 on the principal question. It seems to have been
determined that non-cumulative preferred stockholders cannot force
the directors to pay dividends in a particular year if they see fit to
use the money for legitimate company purposes."' There is some
dissent,' 2 however, on the ground that where there is no real need to
withhold dividends they should be paid, because the failure to do so
would result in their being lost forever. It has also been held-that
non-cumulative dividends, not paid in the particular year earned, can
be subsequently paid by the board, although the language of the par-
ticular contracts involved, rather than the interpretation of the word
"non-cumulative", seems to have been the basis of the decisions.' s
be entitled to any dividends in a particular year if there are not enough
profits in that year to pay the same, or will be entitled only in so far as
there are profits. In such a case the dividends are not cumulative."
And further on, quoting from Bassett v. United States Cast Iron Pipe &
Foundry Company, 75 N. J. Eq. 539, 73 Atl. 514 (1o99) :
"When the reserve fund is accumulated in whole or in part by the
cutting down of dividends which would otherwise have been paid to pre-
ferred (non-cumulative) stockholders, that fund, so far as it represents
moneys so retained is available for the subsequent payment of dividends
upon preferred stock."
See also PALMER, COMPANY PrecedENTS, part I, 577, 579, 812, 820, 108
(rith ed.); PALGRAVE, I Dicr. POLITICAL EcoNoMy, 6o6 (1894); THOMSON
DIcr. BANKING, 507 (1924); CLARK & MARSHALL, COUORATIONS, § 529d
(rgox).
'Dent v. London Tramways Co., L R. 16 Ch. D. 341 (i88o); Staples v.
Eastman Co. [i896] 2 Ch. 3o3.
"Company Precedents (uith ed.), Part x, 577.
'New York, L. E. & W. R. R. Co. v. Nickals, 119 U. S. 296 (1886);
Belfast & M. L. R. P. Co. v. Belfast, 77 Me. 445, 1 AtL 362 (1885).
"Burk v. Ottawa Gas & Electric Co., 87 Kan. 6, 123 Pac. 857 (x91);
Haseltine v. Belfast & M. L. R. P. Co., 79 Me. 411, io Atl. 328 (1888).
' Bassett v. United States C. L P. & F. Co., 74 N. J. Eq. 668, 70 AtL. 929
(i9o8), afFd 75 N. J. Eq. 539, 73 AtL 514 (1909).
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There are numerous dicta as to the proper interpretation of the terms.
"cumulative" and "non-cumulative". With one exception,"4 however,
the three recent decisions mentioned at the beginning of this note are
the first flat holdings on the right of non-cumulative preferred stock-
holders to back dividends earned but not paid before the claims of
common stockholders can be considered.
The two New Jersey cases 1 were applications for injunctions by
both non-cumulative, preferred and common stockholders to restrain
the payment of dividends on each other's stock. It was shown that
for several years back dividends on the non-cumulative preferred
stock had been earned but not paid. In both cases, the contentions
of the non-cumulative preferred stockholders were sustained. An
injunction was refused the common stockholders by a unanimous
court, but the Court of Errors and Appeals divided seven to seven
on the question of the injunction against the common stock dividend.
The lower court having granted the injunction, the decision was
affirmed. Unfortunately the judges in favor of reversal did not print
an opinion. Those adopting the opposite view adopted in full defini-
tion 2 of "non-cumulative". New Jersey by statute has provided:
"The holders of preferred stock shall be entitled to receive and
the corporation shall be bound to pay thereon a fixed yearly dividend
before any dividend shall be paid on the common stock, and
such dividends may be made cumulative, provided that the corporation
shall set apart or pay the said dividends to holders of non-cumulative
preferred stock before any dividend shall be paid on the common
stock." a
Other provisions and decisions have emphasized the policy of New
Jersey in preferring preferred stockholders. The actual decision,
however, is made independent of these considerations."
"Bassett v. United States C. I. P. & F. Co., ibid.; Wood v. Lary, 47 Hun55o (N. Y. 1888).
u Supra, note 1.
"2 N. J. Comp. Stat. (igio) i6o9.
""In the absence of refining differences of designation and prefer-
ences, and restrictions and qualifications thereof, preferred stock, so far
as the payment of dividends is concerned, may, speaking generally, be said
to embrace cumulative preferred stock and non-cumulative preierred stock,
the distinction between the two being that while dividends (not in liquida-
tion) upon each can, of course, only be paid out of profits or surplus (Mc-
Gregor v. Home Ins. Co., 33 N. J. Eq. 181; fills v. Hendershot, 70 N. J.
Eq. 258), the dividends upon cumulative preferred stock have at all times
and for all years, past and present, until paid, priority in payment over
any and all unpaid dividends upon common stock, whether the net earnings
for any particular past or present year were or were not sufficient to pay
the stipulated cumulative dividends upon preferred stock for that year;
whereas, the like priority of dividends upon non-cumulative preferred stock
(wholly or partially as the case may be) is limited to the unpaid divi-
dends for those years when such net earnings were sufficient (wholly or in
NOTES
In the Virginiia case,I
" non-cumulative preferred stockholders
endeavored to enjoin the action of the board of directors in 
declaring
a 5 per cent. dividend on common stock for the year 1923, 
after
providing for a similar dividend for the non-cumulative preferred
stock in that year. There were unpaid but earned dividends amount-
ing to $38 a share on the non-cumulative stock. 
The stock contract
contained the following provision:
"The preferred stock is entitled to the following preferences 
and
to no other. In each and every fiscal year to receive non-cumulative
dividends at and up to the rate of 5% per annum in preference 
and
priority to the payment of any dividend on the common stock 
in
such fiscal year, but only from the net profits of the company 
as such
shall be fixed md determined by the Board of Directors and only 
when
and as such Board shall declare dividends therefrom; but notwith-
standing the preference hereby declared, if, after providing for 
the
payment of dividends for any fiscal year on the preferred stock 
out-
standing in such year, there shall remain a surplus of net profits 
of
such year, the Board of Directors may declare and pay dividends 
upon
any other stock of the company for such year out of such surplus 
net
profits." 19
The court refused the injunction. In its opinion two reasons are
given:
(I) "The phrase 'non-cumulative' carries with it 
the general
idea that the dividends if not declared and paid within any
one yeLr although earnings exist for that year, are lost to
the preferred stockholders."
(2) The contract confers an express right on the board of
directors to declare dividends on the common stock out of the excess
profits of any year when the preferred dividends for that year have
been declared.
It is submitted that while the second reason for the decision is
sound, the first reason is not. As remarked above, "pon-cumulative"
refers solely to the amount of the dividend, not to the time of 
the
payment. It is from the priority clause that the right to dividends
before payment on the common stock can be made arises. The
subsequent language in the stock contract may well override the impli-
cation arising from this preference clause. The language in the
Southern Railway contract clearly does so and on this point the
decision is correct, but in going beyond this, and in adopting definition
corresponding part) to pay such dividends. This distinction renders 
it
self-evident that the suggestion made by counsel that complainant 
is con-
tending for cumulative preferred stock rights for his non-cumulative 
pre-
ferred stock, is without merit." White, J.
'"Supra, note 3.
'Norwich Water Power Co. v. Southern Railway Co., supra, note 3.
614 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAV REVIEW
i of "non-cumulative", it takes a position apparently justified by
neither principle nor authority.
20
The Portland case 21 is in many respects the most interesting
decision of all, for it presents, in addition to the primary issue as to the
rights of non-cumulative stockholders, some difficult secondary prob-
lems of accounting in determining just when a non-cumulative dividend
is earned. The company had outstanding three issues of stock, cumu-
lative 6 per cent. first preferred, non-cumulative 6 per cent. second pre-
ferred and common. For a period of years no dividends were paid on
any of the stock. In Ig2o, the earnings were sufficient to pay the cur-
rent dividend on the cumulative stock, and to leave a balance available
for other dividends amounting to 4 per cent. on the non-cumulative
stock. In 192i, the earnings were sufficient to pay both current and back
dividends on the cumulative stock, and to leave a surplus amounting
to about 2 per cent. on the non-cumulative stock. In I022 the earnings
were sufficient to pay current dividends on both ctmulative and non-
cumulative stock, and to leave a surplus available for common divi-
dends. No dividends on the second preferred or common stock were
paid in any of these years. In order to determine the respective rights
of these two classes of stockholders, the company declared non-
cumulative dividends for the year i92o of one-half of i per cent., and
for the years 1921 and 1922 of 6 per cent. It also declared a common
dividend for the year 1922. Injunctions to restrain paynent of all of
these dividends were sought by the interested parties.
22
On the primary issue, the court held with the non-cunmulative
stockholders, that dividends which were earned but not paid on the
non-cumulative stock must be paid before dividends on the common
stock could be justified. The injunction on the payment of common
stock dividends was therefore granted.
'Although Judge Crump defined "non-cumulative" as quoted above, he
also used the following language, which seems contradictory:
"My conclusion is that it is fairly clear in this case that the unde-
clared dividends were made non-cumulative, and the right to participation,
either on the part of the preferred stockholders or common stockholders
in the earnings ceased altogether upon the failure to declare dividends. I
say the right of the stockholders purposely, because I am not undertaking
to determine what the directors are authorized to do voluntarily, but only
what they may be compelled to do by reason of the legal right existing
on the part of the preferred stockholders."
In connection with that portion of the opinion cited in the text above, and
with the theory advanced by proponents of definition x, it is interesting to
note the following resolution of the Board of Directors of the Southern Rail-
way Company on Thursday, March 12, 1925:
"REsoLvED, that a dividend of i'A% be and hereby is declared on the
preferred stock of Southern Railway Company * * * out of the balance
* * * set aside for the purpose out of profits for the fiscal year ending
December 31, 1924."
= Supra, note 2.
'The actual facts are somewhat simplified for purposes of clearness.
NOTES
In passing on the question of 'how much the non-cumulative
stockholders were entitled to, the court was confronted with three
theories.
It was contended on one hand that in deternining the earnings
for this particular year on the non-cumulative stock only the current
dividend on the cumulative stock should be deducted. A second
theory was that both current and back cumulative dividends must be
deducted from the earnings of the year to determine whether there
was a surplus available for non-cumulative dividends. A third theory
was urged, to the effect that the total surplus of the company was the
criterion by which to determine the earnings for -the year, and that in
coming to a conclusion as to whether there were earnings in the non-
cumulative stock, not only both current and back dividends on the
cumulative stock, but also that part of the surplus which was earned
in years before either the cumulative or the non-cumulative stocks
were issued should be deducted. The possibilities for argument pre-
sented by this situation are, as can be readily understood, almost
unending. In its opinion the court adopted the second theory:
namely, that both back and current dividends on the cumulative stock
must be deducted from the net earnings for the year, 'in order to
determine whether a dividend was earned on the non-cumulative
preferred stock. An extended discussion of the reasoning involved is
impossible at this point, but it is submitted that the result is sound.
The three cases which have just been considered have caused
non-cumulative preferred stockholders of many corporations to inves-
tigate most carefully their claims to back dividends. The next few
years may well see a line of cases arise which will cause considerable
revision of this popular conception of the term "non-cumulative".
Jos. S. C., Jr.
THE DOCTRINE OF DEPENDENT RELATiVE REVOCATION-In
order to prevent a revocation, where a will has been destroyed solely
because of an erroneous belief in the existence of some fact, the
courts have called into being the doctrine of dependent relative rev-
ocation. Under this doctrine, it is presumed that the intention to
revoke is conditioned upon the fact being true, and, the condition
failing, that there is no intention to revoke, and therefore no rev-
ocation.' This doctrine is a development from the rule that the
destruction of a will is an equivocal act, and not a revocation unless
done animo revocandi.2 The application of the doctrine of dependent
relative revocation is well illustrated in the recent English case of
Adams v. Soulhcrden.3 The testator made a will leaving all his prop-
1 Perrott v. Perrott, T4 East 423 (Eng., 1811). See note, 2 B.. R. C. 534
(1905).
2 1 Wiu.is, ExEcUTroRs, § 107 (iith ed., i92i).
S[19251 P. 177.
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erty to his wife. Later, believing that his will was superfluous, be-
cause, as he thought, the intestate laws would give all to his wife,
he tore up the will and burned it. In the suit by his widow to pro-
bate the burned will, the Court of Appeal held that the destruction
was with the intent to revoke only upon the condition that the
intestate laws did give all to his widow, and that, the condition failing,
there was no revocation. This is the first case in which the Court of
Appeal has had to pass upon the question of dependent relative rev-
ocation, but the doctrine is not of recent creation, having existed
for over two hundred years in the English Law,4 and having its
counterpart, if not its origin, in the Roman Law."
The court in the principal case, in accord with an earlier one,6
limits the application of the doctrine to those cases in which the
truth of the fact is, as a matter of construction, the condition of the
revocation. This limitation, it would seem, has but little practical
effect since, once the mistake is proved, the court will presume the
conditional intention.7 The tendency of the American courts is to
be more strict. They put no such limitation on the application of
the doctrine as that of the English courts, but are strict in determin-
ing what is a mistake. Thus, where a testator revoked a bequest to
a son-in-law because he had given him some bonds, when, as a mat-
ter of fact, he had sold him the bonds, the court held that the revo-
cation was not based on a mistake, and that there was therefore no
conditional revocation.$ In the words of the court, "The principle
has no application where the testator has peculiar knowledge of the
facts stated and must know that his assumption is untrue." It is
submitted that the latter view is the correct one, carrying out more
accurately the desires of the testator.
Whether the mistake is one of law or of fact makes no dif-
ferience in the English and in the majority of American courts." This
is rightly so, since the reasons which give rise to the presumption
of a conditional intention are not affected by the nature of the mis-
take. The important fact is the existence, and not the nature, of
the mistake. But there are a few courts in this country which do
* Hyde v. Hyde, 3 Ch. Rep. z55 (Eng., 1707).
'CicERo, DE ORAT., lib. 1, 38: "Pat,.r credens filium suum esse mortuum,
alterum institutit haeredem; filio domi redeunte, hujus institutionis vis est nulla."
'Goddard v. Overend, [i9ii] z Ir. 469, in which the following from
THEOBALD, WILLS 750 (7th ed., i9o8), is quoted and adopted: "The true view
may be that a revocation grounded on an assumption of fact which is false takes
effect unless as a matter of construction the truth of the fact is the condition
of the revocation."
'Goddard v. Overend, supra, note 6.
'Mendinhall's Appeal, 124 Pa. 387, x6 Ad. 881 (1889). Accord: Hayes v.
Hayes, 21 N. J. Eq. 265 (1871). Cf. Goddard v. Overend, supra, note 6.
' Perrott v. Perrott, supra, note I; Strong's Appeal, 79 Conn. r23, 63 Ad.
io8 (ig6).
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not apply the doctrine where the mistake is one of law.
10 Under this
latter view the principal case would needlessly be difficult of solution
since it cannot be said that the mistake is one of fact rather than
law or vice versa.
A very frequent type of mistake, which will give rise to a pre-
sumption of a conditional revocation, is found in those cases where
the testator destroys his will believing that it has been supplanted
by another, when, in fact, the latter is invalid. The courts have
universally held that the testator intended to revoke the first one only
if the second was valid." There are several intimations that, if the
terms of the second will are substantially different from those in the
first, there can be no presumption of a conditional intention.
1 2 There
is some reason for these intimations, since it is very doubtful that
the testator, having drawn up a second will which is materially dif-
ferent from the first, really bases his intent to revoke the first upon
the belief that the second is valid. It is much more likely that his
intent to revoke is based upon his dissatisfaction with the terms of
the will, and it is certainly more consonant with the facts to hold
that he intended an absolute revocation. Similarly, a destruction of
one's will with the intent to make a new one is generally held to be
with the intent to revoke absolutely, and not upon the condition of
the new will being made."
1 The reason sometimes given is that the
court thinks the doctrine a somewhat doubtful one at best. and
is unwilling to extend it beyond those cases in which a mistake is the
basis of the intent to revoke.
1
2 The better reason appears to be that
there can be no presumption of conditional intent,when the testator
so clearly intended to be without a will during the time between the
destruction of the first and the intended making of the second.
15
The cases which were first decided were simple ones and the
use of the doctrine of dependent relative revocation accomplished
substantial justice."' However, in the much more complicated cases
which have arisen, as might have been expected, it is by no means
"'Hairston v. Hairston, 30 Miss. 276 (x855) ; Emernecker's Estate, 218 Pa.
369, 67 AtI. 701 (1907).
'Strong's Appeal, supra, note 9; Estate of Nickels, 114 Me. 338, 96 
AtL.
238 (1916) ; Wilbourn v. Shell, g Miss. 2o5 (i8i) ; Perrott v. Perrott, supra,
note i. But see Powell v. Powell, L R. x P. & D. 209 (1866).
" Strong's Appeal, supra, note 9; Townshend v. Howard, 86 Me. 285, 29
Ad. 1077 (1894) ; Banks v. Banks, 65 Mo. 432 (1877). See note, 6 L1 R. A.
n1o9 (1889). Cf. Powell v. Powell, supra, note Ii.
" In re Olmstead, 122 Cal. 224, 54 Pac. 745 (1898) ; McIntyre v. McIntyre,
i20 Ga. 67, 47 S. E. 501 (904) ; Townshend v. Howard, supra, note 12. Cf.
Dixon v. Solicitor, 21 Times L. R. 145 (Eng., i9o5), where the jury found that
the intention to revoke was conditioned upon the intended will being made.
,Semmes v. Semmes, 7 Har. & J. 388 (Md, 1826).
'$Emernecker's Estate, supra, note 1o.
Doe d. Evans v. Evans, io Ad. & E. 228 (Eng., 1839); Campbell v.
French, 3 Ves. Jr. 321 (Eng., 1797).
618 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
certain that the court, in presuming the testator's intention, has
guessed, with any degree of certainty, what that intentidn would
have been had he known of his mistake. Furthermore, in many of
the later cases, parol evidence is the only proof that the revocation
is grounded on a mistake. It is dangerous to set at naught the revo-
cation, when the case is supported only by such evidence. Such a
policy presents too strong a temptation to the unscrupulous. It can-
not be doubted that in all these cases the presumed conditional in-
tention is contrary to the actual intention of the testator. He de-
stroyed the will with the intent to revoke it. It may clearly appear
that he would not have intended to revoke had he known of the
mistake, but his intent was, nevertheless, to revoke. In those cases
where it is clear, from evidence other than parol, that the testator
never would have revoked had he known of his mistake, the court,
it would seem, is justified in disregarding the actual intent in order
to accomplish what so clearly appears to be the desire of the testator.
The less clear it becomes what the testator's intention would have
been, the more doubtful the case. Certainly the doctrine should not
be extended so far as it was in one case, where the court decided
what the intention of the testator would have been if he had foreseen
the events which subsequently happened.1 7  In this case, there was
not a mistake of any kind, upon which the court could base the con-
ditional intent. Such a decision clearly encroaches upon the right
of the testator to dispose of his property as he will. Dependent
relative revocation is, by its nature, concerned only with those cases
in which a mistake has influenced the intention of the testator. In
such cases it accomplishes satisfactory results, but it should be so
limited.
J. H.
DISTRIBUTION OF STOCK DIVIDENDS BETWEEN HOLDER OF LIFE
INTEREST IN STOCK AND REMAINDERMAN-The question has often
arisen whether a stock dividend of a corporation should be considered
capital or income, it becoming particularly important to decide this
question when the income from stock has been left in trust for one
person, the stock to go to another at his death. It is the rule of the
United States Supreme Court, Massachusetts and several other juris-
dictions that all stock dividends are capital and belong to the remain-
derman.1 The more logical view would seem to be that the stock
ltStickney v. Hammond, 138 Mass. 116 (1884). There the testator
destroyed his first will, having executed a valid second will. Due to a judgment
by default, the second will was not admitted to probate. The court held that
the testator's intention to revoke was conditioned upon the second will being
properly probated.
'Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U. S. 549 (1889); DeKoven v. Alsop, 2o5 I1.
3o9, 68 N. E. 930 (i9o3); Rand v. Hubbell, 115 'Mass. 46! (x874).
NOTES 619
dividend, in so far as it represents a distribution of surplus earned
during the life tenancy, should belong to the life tenant, as income.'
The courts taking this view return to the renainderuan so much of
the stock dividend as will compensate him for the loss to the value of
his shares as they were at the beginning of the trust because of the
issuance of the dividend.3
This latter being the well-established rule in Pennsylvania,
4 the
Supreme Court of that state has recently been called upon to decide
a case-' in which the testator left 120 shares of the Fire Association
of Philadelphia in trust for his nephew and his nephew's wife for
their lives, the principal upon their death to be divided among their
descendants. A few years after the death of the testator the great
San Francisco fire caused such heavy losses as to use up not only
the earnings of the company accumulated between the date of the
death and the fire, but also to use up a large part of the previously
accumulated surplus.6 Later additional stock was issued above par
and a large amount of contributed surplus was realized.' There is no
dispute that the remainderman is entitled to that increase.
8 Recently
a ioo per cent. stock dividend was issued, which is the cause of this
suit. In determining what portion of this dividend represented sur-
plus earned during the life tenancy, the court credited the life tenant
with all of the earnings accumulated after the fire, thereby placing the
burden of the San Francisco fire partly on the life tenant-by first
taking the surplus earned between the death and the fire-and partly
on the remainderman-by charging the residue of the loss against the
intact value of the stock."
As is pointed out in the dissenting opinion of M4r. Justice Kephart,
'Ballantine v. Young, 79 N. J. Eq. 70, 8t Aft. 119 (i91); Matter of
Osborne, 209 N. Y. 450, 1O3 N. E. 723 (1913); Boyer's Appeal, 224 Pa. 144,
73 At. 320 (19o9).
8Ibid.
"Boyer's Appeal, supra, note 2.
'Appeal of Dickinson, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, February 8, i926.
'The capitalization of thd company was o,ooo shares, par $5o, each share
having an actual value at that time of $142.61. The stock increased in value
until just before the great fire it was worth $254.59. Because of that loss it
dropped to $71o.9.
T xo,ooo additional shares were issued realizing q5ooooo more of capital
and a contributed surplus of $2,25oooo.
'Hyde v. Holmes, 198 Mass. 287, 84 N. E. 318 (9o7) ; Robertson v. De
Brulatour, 188 N. Y. 3o, go N. E. 938 (i9o7); Eisner's Estate, 175 Pa. 143,34 Ad. 577 (1896).
'Par value of each share 5o.oo
Earned surplus after the fire 21.09
Amount each share has of contributed surplus 112.50
Value of each of remainderman's shares 183.59
From which is subtracted the present value i52.16
Amount to be returned to remainderman on each share $31.43
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there would seem to be error in calling any of the loss from the great
fire a capital loss. The very means by which a fire insurance company
is enabled to make profits is by paying for the losses from risks which
ii has covered. It could, therefore, almost be called the purpose of
the business to pay such losses. They are in the ordinary year more
than offset by the premiums earned and by interest on investments.
To say that every loss which is paid is a capital loss and every premium
is income, would in a few years wipe out all capital and leave only a
tremendous surplus for the life tenant. This is obviously not the
case, and vet it is hard to find in principle any difference between the
ordinary losses of the company for a year and an extraordinarily large
loss of this character which was incurred in the ordinary course, of
the business for which the company was organized and which has been
more than made tip in the years since the fire.
At the very least, there wonld seem to be no basis for dividing
this loss between capital and income as the court has done. There
must be some one interest which should bear it, there being no dual
character in the nature of the loss which would allocate it to two
interests so opposed to each other. The court rather points to its
manner of distribution as making an equitable division, feeling no
doubt that neither capital nor income should have the hardship of
bearing so great a misfortune. Under the view taken by the majority
of the court, the allocation of a loss, such as the one in this case, either
to the life tenant as a loss to be charged against income, or to the
remainderman as a loss to the corpus of the estate, is made to depend
upon the status of the surplus account at the time the loss takes place.
Thus, under their reasoning, any loss which entailed impairment of
the surplus account as it stood at the time of the testator's death must
be considered a capital loss to the full amount of such impairment,
whereas if the loss could be entirely paid for out of the surplus
acctmulated after the testator's death, it must be treated as an oper-
ating loss, chargeable to the life tenant. The inequitable effect of this
doctrine is manifest when applied to imaginary cases which might as
easily have arisen as the actual one: (i) A loss occurring immediately
following the testator's death, in which case there would have been no
opportunity for surplus to have been earned and the entire loss would
necessarily fall upon the corpus of the estate. (2) A loss of the same
There would seem to be an error in the figures used by the court in arriv-
ing at this result, in that it has divided the contributed surplus by 2o,ooo shares
because of the doubling of the original capital, and has failed to divide the earned
surplus in the same manner. It is just as true that the amount which each share
has of earned surplus has'bean so reduced as that the contributed surplus has
been. This would change the calculations in the following way:
Par value so.oo
Earned surplus as reduced by the new shares 0.55
Contributed surplus J12.50
Value of remainderman's shares 173.05
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size and character occurring a number of years later and after
sufficient earnings had been accumulated to pay the entire amount, in
which case, although the loss were identical in every particular, it
would fall wholly upon the life tenant under the rule laid down by
the court. These examples seem to illustrate clearly the artificiality
of such a doctrine. Whether a loss is a capital loss to be deducted
from the corpus of the estate or an operating loss to be deducted from
surplus otherwise available for distribution to the life tenant, is made
to depend upon mere chance rather than upon well-recognized princi-
ples as to what constitute operating and capital losses.'
0
The correct solution of the case, as shown in the dissenting
opinion, would seem to be that the loss from the San Francisco fire
should not be charged against capital at all, but should be taken
entirely from the earnings of the company during the life tenancy,
whether these earnings were made before or after the fire. The basis
of the calculations as to the amount to be returned to the remainder-
man because of the decrease in the value of his shares due to the
issuance of the stock dividend should therefore be the value of the
stock at the beginning of the trust and not the value after the fire."
The evil effect of the doctrine in this case cannot be over-
emphasized. It opens the gate to similar claims by holders of the life
interest in the stock of any corporation which has sustained severe
or unusual operating losses (such as were so common in the numerous
inventory write-downs of 1921) and which has subsequently issued a
stock dividend. Such losses are well recognized to be operating losses,
and under settled principles of accounting should be charged against
the interest of the one who is entitled to operating income.
T.P.M.
"Were the entire loss to be called a capital loss, the result would
be this:
Value of each share at the testator's death 142.61
Loss per share from the great fire 183.50
Making the value of the remainderman's shares a deficit of 40.89
Add to this the contributed surplus 112-50
Present value of remainderman's shares 71.61
Since this value is less than the present value of the stock, nothing need
be returned to the remainderman.
' If this view of the case were taken, the result would be:
Value of each share at par 5.00
Plus 7/2 the surplus at testator's death (9z61) because of the
issue of the new shares 46.30
Plus the contributed surplus which each share has 112.50
Value of remainderman's shares 208.80
Subtracting the present value i52.6
Making the amount to be returned on each share to the remain-
derman $s6.64
